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Unsolicited internal complaints:  
the False sense oF protection against 




What would you do if you discovered a statutory violation that could 
affect the benefits of nearly everyone at the company you work for, including 
yourself? Even further, what if your job required you to report such violations 
in order to avoid personal liability?  
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)1 provides a 
specific provision—section 510—to prevent retaliation against whistleblowers 
who report such violations.2 Unfortunately, the Federal Circuits are split on 
the scope of protection section 510 provides. This Note analyzes this split and 
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me. Additional thanks to Professor Maher for his assistance with the writing of this Note.  
1.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001–1461 (2006).
2. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (2006) (prohibiting retaliation for exercising rights given by 
an employee benefit plan or ERISA, testifying before a proceeding related to ERISA or 
testifying before Congress related to a multiemployer plan).
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suggests that section 510 should be interpreted to protect employees who, 
without being asked, report ERISA violations internally. 
Part I provides a background of ERISA overall, describing the breadth 
of the preemptive and remedial scope of ERISA before focusing on section 
510.3 Part II considers the issue of unsolicited internal complaints and how 
the circuits are split. Special attention is placed on the Third Circuit’s most 
recent holding that unsolicited internal complaints are not afforded protection 
by section 510.4 Part III argues that unsolicited internal complaints need to 
be protected under section 510 for at least three reasons: (1) the protection of 
unsolicited internal complaints is consistent with congressional intent, (2) the 
text of section 510, as compared to other anti-retaliation provisions in other 
federal statutes, supports protection of unsolicited internal complaints, and (3) 
section 510 reflects the view of the Secretary of Labor, whose interpretative 
position is coherent and attractive as a policy matter.5 Part IV concludes by 
predicting future issues with remedies associated with section 510.6      
backgroUnd law: the history oF erisa
The Formation and Purpose of ERISA
erisa was enacted to regulate employee benefit plans, which in the early 
1970’s affected millions of people and involved billions of dollars; today 
ERISA affects hundreds of millions of people and trillions of dollars.7 ERISA 
defines an employee benefit plan to include both welfare and pension plans, 
and the type of plan determines the protection provided under ERISA.8 
Regardless, however, of whether the subject plan is an employee welfare plan 
or an employee pension plan, ERISA’s purpose is to allow for a “uniform 
regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”9 To achieve this purpose, 
Congress created a preemption provision within ERISA. Preemption was 
 
 
3. See infra Part I (outlining the reasoning and purpose underlying the creation of 
ERISA and the extensive preemption provisions contained within it).
4. See infra, Part II (describing the treatment by various circuit courts of the levels 
of protection afforded to unsolicited internal complaints under ERISA § 510).
5. See infra Part III (arguing that by denying certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court 
failed to provide important guidance on the expansive protection for unsolicited internal 
complaints under ERISA § 501).  
6. See infra Part IV (declaring that even if employees are protected when making 
unsolicited internal complaints, they would be only entitled forms of equitable relief).  
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (recognizing that with the size and importance of 
employee benefit plans, the regulation was required by the national interest and to protect 
the revenue of the United States).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (defining welfare plans as providing medical or hospital 
benefits; benefits in case of death, unemployment, disability, or accident; benefits for 
vacation, day care, or scholarship; or for prepaid legal services); § 1002(2) (defining 
pension plans as including any program, fund, or plan created in order to endow with 
retirement income to either the employee or beneficiary).
9. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). 
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enacted within ERISA to ensure “that the administrative practices of a benefit 
plan will be governed by only a single set of regulations.”10
The Expansive Reach of ERISA and Preemption
In order to make sure that the provisions of ERISA are fully achieved, ERISA 
liberally preempts state law.11 Preemption is achieved by, first, statutorily 
providing for preemption of almost all state laws involving employee benefit 
plans.12 In particular, section 514(a) of ERISA broadly states that “the provisions 
of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”13 The intent behind 
section 514(a) allows for “subject[ification] to a uniform body of benefits law . 
. . [and prevention of] the potential for conflict in substantive law.”14  
Second, ERISA preempts state law that is outside of the statute’s express 
preemption provisions.15 This most frequently occurs in situations where the 
state law claim asserted by a plaintiff enlarges or conflicts with the remedies 
set forth in section 502.16 Section 502(a) of ERISA allows for civil enforcement 
so as to achieve “a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims 
settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation 
of employee benefit plans.”17 In doing so, Section 502(a) defines who is able to 
bring a civil action and what remedies will be made available to them.18 More 
specifically, section 502(a)(1)(B), allows for the bringing of a civil action “by 
a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms 
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”19  
State law causes of action that duplicate or supplement the relief available 
under section 502(a)(1)(B) are preempted, on the grounds that ERISA provides 
10. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
11. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523–24 (1981) (prohibiting 
even indirect state regulation of pension and benefit plans as an intrusion on an exclusive 
federal concern).
12. Gabner v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 938 F. Supp. 1295, 1301 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006) (providing exceptions for certain state laws under 
ERISA 1003(b)).
14. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1995) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 
142 (1990)).
15. See King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (outlining 
the doctrine of complete preemption and Congress may eliminate certain remedies by 
preempting state law claims). 
16. See id. (providing that state law claims falling under ERISA § 502 convert into 
federal claims and may be removed to federal court).
17. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
18. 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) (2006) (allowing plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries 
and the Secretary of Labor to bring an action seeking a variety of remedies under law and 
equity). 
19. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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the exclusive remedy for benefit denials.20 Even if ERISA fails to provide a 
particular or requested remedy, this does not mean that each and every state-
law remedy is preserved.21 In other words, preemption of a state law by ERISA 
may leave a plaintiff with no available remedy. This provision has been 
described as “disappointingly pernicious to the very goals and desires that 
motivated Congress to enact [these] laws in the first place.”22 But it is the law. 
Anti-Retaliation Protection Under ERISA Section 510
Section 510 was designed to protect whistleblowers who report ERISA 
violations.23 For the purpose of this Note, the relevant part of the provision 
states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, 
expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given information 
or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to 
[ERISA] or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.”24  
This essentially offers protection in the following situations: “(1) when a 
person has given information in any inquiry or proceeding relating to ERISA; 
(2) when a person has testified in any inquiry or proceeding relating to ERISA; 
or (3) when a person is about to testify in any such inquiry or proceeding.”25 
Section 510 of ERISA protects “all employees covered by a benefit plan.”26 
Section 510 also covers fiduciaries, which are defined under ERISA as any 
person that “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control 
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control 
respecting management or disposition of its assets . . . or . . . has any 
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of 
such plan.”27 A fiduciary is “personally liable to make good . . . any losses to 
the plan resulting from each . . . [fiduciary] breach.”28    
20. See, e.g., McSharry v. Unumprovident Corp. 237 F. Supp. 2d 875, 882 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2002) (holding that whether or not a specific requested remedy exists under ERISA 
is immaterial, rather the courts must look at whether Congress designed a mechanism to 
enforce the duties of ERISA entities). 
21. Id.
22. Sanson v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., 
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s holding that state law claims, even in instances 
where no conflict with federal law exists, are barred despite a lack of remedy under federal 
law). 
23.  Id. (Birch, J., dissenting) (juxtaposing a judicially created cause of action in state 
law with the stautory cause of action in ERISA § 510).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
25. Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant for 
Reversal at 6, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 03–9186) 
[hereinafter Brief of the Secretary of Labor for Nicolaou].
26. Terry Collingsworth, ERISA Section 510: A Further Limitation on Arbitrary 
Discharges, 10 indUs. rel. L.J. 319, 320 (1988).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).
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Unsolicited internal complaints and the circUit split
Appellate courts differ on whether and how unsolicited internal complaints 
qualify as “inquiries or proceedings” that fall under the protection of the 
anti-retaliation provision of section 510 of ERISA.29 Of interest is the Third 
Circuit’s recent opinion in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc. After surveying 
the case law of the other circuits that have directly or indirectly considered the 
issue, the Third Circuit determined that unsolicited internal complaints do not 
deserve protection under section 510.30  
Decisions Affording Unsolicited Internal Complaints Protection Under 
Section 510 of ERISA.
In Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii,31 Jessica Hashimoto brought a complaint 
under state law alleging wrongful discharge after she had discussed possible 
ERISA violations with the employee’s supervisor.32 The Ninth Circuit found 
that the Hawaii Whistle Blowers’ Protection Act (“HWBPA”)33 was preempted 
by ERISA, and in so holding, noted that section 510 of ERISA “may be fairly 
construed to protect a person in Hashimoto’s position if, in fact, she was fired 
because she was protesting a violation of law in connection with an ERISA 
plan.”34 The Third Circuit described the Ninth Circuit’s holding as a conclusion 
that a “failure of section 510 to protect internal complaints would . . . inhibit 
the effectiveness of the anti-retaliation provision.”35  
The Fifth Circuit next considered the issue in the case of Anderson v. 
Electronic Data Systems Corp.36 Shortly after George Anderson, a manager in 
EDS’ Domestic Treasury Department, contacted management about activities 
that would violate ERISA, he was demoted and eventually fired because 
of what Anderson claimed was “his refusal to commit illegal activities at 
[another employee’s] request and because of his reporting [those] activities 
to [Electronic Data Systems] Management.”37 Although Anderson initially 
brought a state wrongful discharge cause of action, the action was removed to 
 
29. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 2011 WL 767661 (2011) (No. 10–732) (holding that section 510 of ERISA does not 
protect an employee’s unsolicited internal complaints to management).
30. Id.
31. 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining that unsolicited internal complaints are 
protected under section 510).
32. Id. at 409–10.
33. haw. rev. stat. § 378–62 (West 1987). The Hawaii Whistle Blowers’ Protection 
Act is similar to section 510 of ERISA and states that “an employer shall not discharge, 
threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee . . . because: (1) [t]he employee . 
. . reports or is about to report to the employer, or reports or is about to report to a public 
body, verbally or in writing, a violation.”   
34. Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
35. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2010).
36. See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(“Anderson’s ‘claim falls squarely within the ambit of ERISA § 510’”).
37. Id. at 1312–13.
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federal court on complete preemption grounds.38 The Fifth Circuit determined 
that Anderson’s claim “[fell] squarely within the ambit of ERISA § 510.”39   
B.  Holdings Declining Protection For Unsolicited Internal Complaints 
Under Section 510 of ERISA.
In King v. Marriott International Inc., the Fourth Circuit decided that an 
employee’s unsolicited internal complaint was not protected under section 
510.40 Karen King, a Marriott’s benefits department employee, filed a complaint 
alleging wrongful discharge under state law that was later removed to federal 
courts since the action was completely preempted by ERISA.41 The Fourth 
Circuit relied heavily on one of their prior decisions regarding the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”), where it was determined that the term “proceeding” 
did not relate to internal complaints.42 Further, it determined that “testify” 
relates to “a formality that does not attend an employee’s oral complaint to 
his supervisor.”43 Using this prior decision, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
the words “testified or is about to testify” imply that the following words of 
“inquiry or proceeding” require additional formalities than those provided by 
a verbal or written complaint to an employee’s manager.44 Without further 
information stating that King had testified or was about to testify, the only solid 
information provided by King’s complaint is that she provided an unsolicited 
internal complaint to her supervisor, leaving her outside of the protections 
provided by section 510, according to the Fourth Circuit.45  
In 2005, the Second Circuit decided Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.46 
Horizon originally hired Chrystina Nicolaou as their director of Human 
Resources and Administration, where she was also a fiduciary of the company’s 
benefits plan.47 Nicolaou reported an ERISA violation to the Chief Financial 
Officer of Horizon.48 When the CFO failed to acknowledge the situation, she 
38. Id. at 1314.  
39. Id.
40. See King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
ERISA did not completely preempt a state wrongful discharge claim because the employee’s 
actions were internal unsolicited complaints not protected under section 510 of ERISA).
41. Id. at 423.  
42. Id. at 427. The provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act that the Fourth Circuit 
was comparing to section 510 states that it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge or in 
any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any 
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this act, 
or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
43. King, 337 F.3d at 427.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 427–28 (explaining that the narrow interpretation of section 510 has led to 
a “much more circumscribed” remedy).
46. See Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding 
that someone other than the employee must initiate the “inquiry” to allow protection of 
section 510 to be applicable for internal complaints).
47. Id. at 326.
48. Id.
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contacted Silverman, an attorney for Horizon.49 Nicolaou and Silverman then 
had a meeting with Koenigsberg, the President of Horizon, although it was not 
clear whether Silverman or Nicolaou had arranged the meeting.50 Following the 
meeting, Nicolaou alleged that Horizon initiated a “campaign of retaliation” 
against her, resulting in her termination.51  
Nicolaou brought suit against Horizon alleging wrongful termination after 
she informed management about issues with Horizon’s benefit plan including 
both violations of ERISA and FLSA.52 The District Court dismissed her section 
510 claim on the grounds that section 510 does not protect an employee against 
retaliation for internal inquiries.53 On appeal, the Second Circuit took a slightly 
different approach than that of the Fourth Circuit by stating that “the proper 
focus is not on the formality or informality . . . under which an individual 
gives information, but rather on whether the circumstances can fairly be 
deemed to constitute an ‘inquiry.’”54 By looking at the differences between 
FLSA and ERISA, the Second Circuit determined that the use of the term 
“inquiry” (a different word than the term “proceeding”) allows section 510 to 
protect information gathered in an informal situation.55 Although “proceeding” 






51. See id. at 326–27 (stipulating that soon after Horizon initiated the “campaign of 
retaliation” against Nicolaou, Mr. “Koenigsberg announced that he was bringing a ‘real’ 
Human Resources professional into the organization that would report directly to him. 
Soon afterward, ‘Nicolaou was formally advised that she was being replaced as the Director 
of Human Resources’ . . . This process of what the amended complaint characterizes as 
‘professional trashing’ ended with Nicolaou being terminated by Horizon on November 7, 
2000.”).
52. See id. at 327 (identifying the initial complaint on January 31, 2001, and an 
amended complaint on April 24, 2001. “The amended complaint states two causes of action 
for illegal retaliation arising from its allegations that Horizon demoted and eventually 
terminated Nicolaou after she had raised concerns about Horizon’s funding of its 401(k) 
plan: (1) a violation of sections 15 and 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201–219. And (2) a violation of section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (‘ERISA’), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 ¶¶ 48, 51.”).
53. See id. (granting Horizon’s motion to dismiss on September 25, 2003, in 
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court held that 
“Nicolaou had no cause of action under FLSA because sections 15 and 16 do not make 
it illegal for a firm to retaliate against an employee for bringing complaints within the 
firm.”) The Court first held that Nicolaou’s first complaint failed to state the appropriate 
relief requested and dismissed the section 510 claim. Id. The second dismissal came after 
Nicolaou amended the claim to state the appropriate relief requested. Id.
54. See id. at 330 (finding that even though the Fourth Circuit’s decision in King v. 
Marriot Int’l, Inc. focused on whether the circumstances amounted to an “inquiry,” “we do 
not believe that our holding is in conflict” with this ruling.)
55. See id. at 328–29 (agreeing with the Secretary of Labor that Congress’s choice of 
the word inquiry, rather than proceeding, serves as indicative intent “to ensure protection 
for those involved in the informal gathering of information”).
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to cover any “request for information.”56 The Second Circuit concluded that an 
“inquiry” does include an informal “request for information.”57 
An apparently significant factor for the Second Circuit was whether 
Silverman had proposed that he and Nicolaou meet with Koenigsberg.58 If 
the meeting with Koenigsberg was actually suggested by Silverman, and 
not Nicolaou, then even though the meeting was not of a formality such as a 
proceeding, it would still fit the definition of an inquiry since it would have 
been a request for information.59 Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, if an 
internal complaint is made that is solicited, even if informal, it qualifies for 
protection under section 510.60 The Third Circuit read the opinion to stand for 
the converse proposition, namely that an unsolicited complaint would, under 
the Second Circuit’s reasoning, not be information given in response to or as 
part of an inquiry, and thus not be protected.61 
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc. and the Third Circuit’s Decision 
 Against Protection for Unsolicited Internal Complaints
In Edwards, the Third Circuit held that section 510 did not protect 
unsolicited internal complaints. A.H. Cornell hired Shirley Edwards in 2006 
to create a human resources department as well as act as the Human Resources 









56. See id. at 329 (holding that the term proceeding specifically refers to “the 
progression of a lawsuit or business before a court, agency, or other official body.”).
57. See id. (comparing definitions of inquiry and proceeding as found in Black’s Law 
Dictionary, which defined inquiry as “[a] request for information” and Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary, which defined inquiry as “the act or an instance of seeking 
truth, information, or knowledge about something” or “a request for information.”).
58. See id. (“Although the amended complaint is unclear on the matter, Nicolaou’s 
counsel asserted at oral argument that it was Silverman’s suggestion that they meet with 
Koensberg.”).
59. See id. at 330 (“If Nicolaou can demonstrate that she was contacted to meet with 
Koenigsberg in order to give information about the alleged underfunding of the Plan, her 
actions would fall within the protection of section 510.”).
60. See id. (finding that under the assumption that Nicolaou was solicited for the 
information, then even if “[t]he meeting with Koenigsberg was something less than a 
formal proceeding . . . we believe it was sufficient to constitute an “inquiry” within the 
meaning of section 510.”).
61. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 222–223 (3d Cir. 
2010) (holding that the court in Nicolaou “held that unsolicited internal complaints are 
not protected activities,” essentially assuming that because the Second Circuit held that a 
solicited complaint was protected under section 510, that an unsolicited complaint could 
not be protected).
62. Id. at 218.
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Cornell, and when she informed management that she “objected to” these 
ERISA violations, she alleged she was fired as a result.63  
After her termination from A.H. Cornell, Edwards brought a complaint stating 
a claim arising from section 510 of ERISA.64 The District Court dismissed 
the case, concluding that Edwards’ “alleged objections and/or complaints to 
management” were not part of an “inquiry or proceeding.”65 Because Edwards 
was not approached by anyone requesting information from her concerning 
the alleged violations, but instead voluntarily offered the information, that did 
not qualify as an “inquiry or proceeding,” and therefore was not protected 
under the section 510 anti-retaliation provision.66  
The Third Circuit affirmed. Because Edwards was not asked for information, 
but instead volunteered information, the Third Circuit concluded that Edwards’ 
complaint was not a part of an inquiry.67 Edwards had argued that her complaint 
was in fact the inquiry itself, but the Third Circuit disagreed; section 510 only 
covers, by its terms “inquiries made of an employee.”68    
The Third Circuit was unpersuaded by Edwards’ argument that ERISA’s 
status as a remedial statute should justify a more expansive and protective 
reading of section 510.69 According to the Third Circuit, “clear statutory 
language” settled the issue, and, in any event, if Congress had intended to 
allow for unsolicited internal complaints to be protected by section 510, it 
would have drafted section 510 using broad language similar to that of Title 
63. See id. at 219 (stipulating that Edwards claims she discovered several ERISA 
violations including “allegedly administering the group health plan on a discriminatory 
basis, misrepresenting to some employees the cost of group health coverage in an effort 
to dissuade employees from opting into benefits, and enrolling non-citizens in its ERISA 
plans by providing false Social Security numbers and other fraudulent information to 
insurance carriers.” She alleges that because of her objections to these ERISA violations, 
she was terminated “on or around February 11, 2009.”).
64. See id. (“On March 18, 2009, Edwards filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania against A.H. Cornell, Cornell, 
and Closterman, asserting an anti-retaliation claim under section 510 of ERISA and 
common law wrongful discharge.”).
65. Id. In granting the motion to dismiss on July 23, 2009, the Court cited Nicolaou 
v. Horizon Media, Inc. as the persuasive authority supporting the court’s ruling.  See id. 
66. See id. (“[p]laintiff does not allege that anyone requested information from her or 
initiated contact with her in any way regarding the alleged ERISA violations. Nor does she 
allege that she was involved in any type of formal or informal gathering of information. She 
states merely that she objected to or complained about certain conduct by Defendants.”).
67. Id. Additionally, the Third Circuit states that under Black’s Law Dictionary’s 
definition of a proceeding, there was no information leading to a determination that a 
proceeding occurred in Edwards’ situation. Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defined proceeding 
as “[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit” or the “procedural means for seeking 
redress from a tribunal or agency.” Id. (citing black’s law dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 
2009)).
68. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 223–224. 
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VII. Congress avoided doing so.70
The Third Circuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in King. In 
determining that while not all statutes relating to anti-retaliation limit the 
protection to formal actions, the wording of ERISA using the phrase “testified 
or is about to testify” modifies the two relevant terms of “inquiry or proceeding” 
to only involve actions that are of a more formal nature than unsolicited internal 
complaints.71 In contrast, the Third Circuit found the Hashimoto and Anderson 
decisions unpersuasive because both decisions failed to look at section 510 
with any “detail.”72  
The Third Circuit here dismissed Edwards’ use of two prior Third Circuit 
decisions, Brock v. Richardson73 and Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners 
v. United States Department of Labor,74 since neither case discussed the 
applicability of Section 510 of ERISA.75 In doing so, the Third Circuit held 
that since the other anti-retaliation statutes were not identical to ERISA, 
the previous decisions regarding other anti-retaliation provisions are not 
70. See id. at 223–224. (Holding that “[a[lthough ERISA ‘should be liberally 
construed in favor of protecting the participants in employment benefit plans,’ (citing IUE 
AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson Inc. 788 F.2d 118,127 (3d Cir.1986)) this 
does not entitle us to ignore clear statutory language. See Wolk v. UNUM Life In. of Am., 
186 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir.1999) (“[A]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to 
the contrary, [ERISA’s statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”) 
(quotations and citations omitted). If section 510 were ambiguous, we would construe 
the provision in favor of plan participants. However, as discussed above, we find the 
provision’s plan meaning to be clear.”).
71. Id at 223.
72. See id. (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in King).
73. 812 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1987).
74. 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993).
75. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224. The cases cited by Edwards discussed other anti-
retaliation statutes such as FLSA Section 15(a)(3) in Brock and the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
Section 507(a) in Passaic Valley. Id.
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dispositive.76  
In Brock v. Richardson, the Third Circuit held that an employer’s mistaken 
belief that an employee has filed a report with the Wage and Hour Division 
when in fact the employee has not filed a report, allows the employee to be 
protected against anti-retaliation under FLSA.77 George Banyas worked for 
Richardson Construction as a laborer, owned and operated by Homer and 
Virginia Richardson, from 1977 until he was fired in October 1980.78 During 
this employment, Banyas was interviewed by an officer with the Wage and 
Hour Division about a complaint that Richardson Construction had not been 
paying overtime wages.79 Despite not filing a complaint, upon being asked, 




76. The court first analyzed the comparison between the case at hand and Brock. 
Brock pertained to an action brought by an employee under the Federal Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA), alleging that the employee was discharged because his employer believed 
he had filed a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, 
in violation of the FLSA. The court found Brock distinguishable from the case before 
it, as:it concerned a different issue in the context of a different statute. We examined in 
Brock whether ‘an employer’s [mistaken] belief that an employee has engaged in protected 
activity is sufficient to trigger application of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, 
and held in the affirmative. We did not address whether section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA 
protects internal complaints. However the court holds that even if the FLSA does in fact 
protect internal complaints, Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA and section 510 of ERISA are 
not identical. Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA extends broadly to persons that have ‘filed any 
complaint,’ without explicitly stating the level of formality required. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
Section 510 of ERISA, in contrast, extends only to persons that have ‘given information 
or [ ] testified’ in an ‘inquiry’ or ‘proceeding.’ 29 U.S.C. § 1140. The word complaint is 
not even used. Therefore, the conclusion that internal complaints are protected under the 
FLSA does not required a parallel conclusion under ERISA’s distinct statutory language. 
See id. at 224–225 (finding that neither Brock nor Passaic Valley are dispositive in the case 
at hand) (internal quotations omitted). 
The court then turned to its analysis of Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’r v. U.S. Dept. 
of Labor, where the court previously examined whether intracorporate complaints are 
protected under section 507(a) of the [Clean Water Act]. The court held that: Although it 
might appear so at first glance, Passaic Valley is not dispositive here for a couple of reasons, 
not the least of which is that Passaic Valley addresses section 507(a) of the CWA, not 
section 510 of ERISA.” The court also held that this case is not dispositive of the present 
case because “we did not state in Passaic Valley that the term ‘proceeding’ is necessarily 
ambiguous in all anti-retaliation provisions. Rather, we expressly stated that the term 
‘proceeding’ is ambiguous ‘within § 507(a) of the Clean Water Act[.]” Passaic Valley, 992 
F.2d at 478 (emphasis added). The court also distinguished Passaic Valley from the present 
case as Passaic Valley “gave Chevron deference to the Secretary of Labor’s ‘reasonably 
permissive construction’ that ‘all good faith intracorporate allegations are fully protected 
from retaliation under § 507(a)[.]’” Id. at 480. Contrary to the Secretary’s suggestion here, 
we do not likewise owe Chevron deference to the Secretary’s allegedly consistent reading 
of section 510. (internal quotations omitted).
77. Brock, 812 F.2d at 121–123 (specifying the purpose of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) was to protect certain activity and that the discharge of an employee based on 
mere suspicion of the employee’s engagement in protected activities was impermissible 
under the FLSA). William E. Brock, the plaintiff, was the Secretary of Labor at the time.  
78. Id. at 122.  
79. Id. 
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not been paid for overtime hours worked at Richardson Construction.80 Three 
days after Banyas talked to the Wage and Hour Division officer he was fired.81 
After his termination, Banyas then filed a complaint with the Wage and Hour 
Division alleging discriminatory discharge and Donald Swanson was sent to 
investigate.82 Homer claims that Banyas was fired for “careless work habits, 
poor performance and belligerent attitude.”83 However, Virginia later told 
the Assistant Area Director of the Wage and Hour Division that Banyas was 
fired “because she believed he had filed a complaint with the Wage and Hour 
Division.”84  
Based on these facts, the Third Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision 
of FLSA applies when the employer mistakenly believes an employee filed a 
report and fires the employee on this belief—even though the employee never 
filed a report.85 However, the Third Circuit in Edwards quickly dismissed the 
use of its prior decision in Brock since Brock was not deciding whether an 
internal complaint was protected under an anti-retaliation statute.86 This is in 
conflict with the Third Circuit’s reliance on King, which directly compared and 
contrasted ERISA and FLSA to determine if internal complaints are protected.87 
From Edwards it appears that the Third Circuit only relies on interpretations 
of other anti-retaliation provisions when it likes the particular interpretation.  
The Third Circuit additionally dismissed Edwards’ use of Passaic Valley 
as precedent, even though the court in Passaic Valley was deciding whether 
an employee’s consistent intracorporate complaints allowed protection under 
the anti-retaliation act within the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).88 In Passaic 
Valley, Joseph Guttman, an employee of Passaic Valley, filed numerous reports 
to his superior stating that a system used by Passaic Valley was in violation 





84. Id. at 122–123. Virginia later stated to Donald Swanson that Banyas was fired 
because “he was a troublemaker, had caused them problems with the government and the 
union, and had ruined equipment and not done jobs properly.” Id at 122.   
85. Id. at 125 (“the discharge of an employee in the mistaken belief that the employee 
has engaged in protected activity creates the same atmosphere of intimidation as does the 
discharge of an employee who did in fact complain of FLSA violations”).  
86. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting 
Brock was not applicable since the Brock court did not determine whether internal 
complaints were protected under the FLSA).
87. See id. at 221 (focusing on the proper scope of the phrase “inquiry or proceeding” 
the court analogized section 510 to the anti-retaliation provision in the FLSA).
88. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’r v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 475 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (holding the employer’s discharge of its employee violated the whistle-blower 
provision of the Clean Water Act).
89. Passaic 992 F.2d at 476. (Guttman was PVSC’s Chief of Laboratory and Stream 
Pollution Control and expressed concern to his supervisor and company officials about 
PVSC’s procedure used to monitor wastewater discharges by PVSC’s industrial customers.)
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company, yet the only job eliminated in this reorganization was Guttman’s.90  
In determining if Guttman was protected against anti-retaliation under 
the CWA, the Third Circuit determined that the term “proceeding” was 
ambiguous.91 Therefore, the Third Circuit looked at the purpose of the statute 
and its legislative history to determine that the term “proceeding” should be 
interpreted to encompass intracorporate complaints.92 However, the Third 
Circuit in Edwards found this comparison unpersuasive and subsequently 
dismissed Edwards’ reliance on the Passaic Valley case.  
Unsolicited internal complaints command protection
In denying certiorari in Edwards, the United States Supreme Court has 
missed an important opportunity to bring uniformity to the law. The Court 
should have granted certiorari, and held that section 510 affords protection to 
unsolicited internal complaints. Such a holding would have been consistent 
with the underlying intent of Congress and the views of the Secretary of Labor, 
and would have accurately reflected the different textual construction of 
section 510 as compared to anti-retaliation provisions in other federal statutes. 
Congressional Intent
If the Third Circuit had more thoroughly examined the intent of Congress, 
they would have discovered that section 510 is “viewed . . . as a crucial part 
of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent the 
provision of promised benefits.”93 The use of anti-retaliation provisions is 
usually provided to “encourage employees to report potential violations and 
assure the cooperation on which accomplishment of ERISA’s protective 
purposes depends.”94    
90. Id. at 477 (“The termination decision was purportedly made strictly upon the 
fiscal needs of the PVSC and Guttman’s lack of seniority, and ‘had nothing to do with 
individual personalities.’”).
91. Id. at 478. The relevant portion of the CWA states: “No person shall fire, or in 
any other way discriminate against…any employee…by reason…that such employee…
has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under this chapter, 
or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration or 
enforcement of the [Clean Water Act].” 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2011).
92. Id. (finding that the statute’s purpose is to encourage employees to report 
violations and to afford broad protection against anti-retaliation). If employees are required 
to make formal complaints, the purpose of the statute would be lost. Id.  
93. Inter-Modal Rail Emp. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 
510, 515 (1997) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)).
94. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant For 
Reversal at 13, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 
09–3198).
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By narrowly construing the terms of section 510 as the Third Circuit has 
done in Edwards,95 a key objective of the provision is frustrated. Narrow 
interpretation of section 510 allows, and perhaps even encourages, management 
to intervene in the process of creating a formal complaint by the employee, 
which would be protected under section 510 of ERISA.96  
In determining that unsolicited internal complaints are not protected, 
courts are allowing employers to interrupt a complaint before it is made. This 
discourages employees from reporting violations. As the Ninth Circuit put it: 
[t]he normal first step in giving information or testifying in any way 
that might tempt an employer to discharge [an employee] would be 
to present the problem first to the responsible managers of the ERISA 
plan. If [an employee] is then discharged for raising the problem, the 
process of giving information or testifying is interrupted at its start: 
the anticipatory discharge discourages the whistleblower before the 
whistle is blown.97
 
 While an employee may only be making a moral decision in deciding 
whether or not to report an ERISA violation, a fiduciary risks more than moral 
self-worth in deciphering if and how to report an ERISA violation. Under 
ERISA, if a fiduciary “has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary,” 
liability will be on the fiduciary “unless he makes reasonable efforts under the 
circumstances to remedy the breach.”98 Therefore, in order for a fiduciary to 
avoid personal liability under ERISA, they are encouraged “to take steps to 
remedy perceived improprieties in plan operations.”99 As a result, employees 
who are plan fiduciaries, like Nicolaou, are apparently left without protection 
unless an inquiry is made upon them even though it is in their own personal 
best interest to report the ERISA violation.100 Consequently, the writing of 
section 510 to have no “exceptions for fiduciaries,” only exemplifies the need 
 
 
95. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 225–226 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that the ERISA statutory language is distinguishable from the FLSA language 
and the fact that internal complaints are protected under the FLSA does not automatically 
render them protected under ERISA).
96. See McLean v. Carlson Cos., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (D. Minn. 1991).
97. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 221 (quoting Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F. 2d 408 
(9th Cir. 1993)).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3) (2011) (“[A] fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable 
for a breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan in 
the following circumstances: (1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes 
to conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a 
breach; (2) if, by his failure to comply with section 404(a)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)] in 
the administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduciary, 
he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or (3) if he has knowledge of a 
breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances 
to remedy the breach.”)
99. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 331 (2d Cir. 2005) (Pooler, J., 
concurring).
100. Id. at 330 (majority opinion).
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of section 510 to provide protection for unsolicited internal complaints in 
order to satisfy Congress’s intent.101   
In summary, allowing protection of unsolicited internal complaints under 
section 510 of ERISA will further Congress’s ultimate goal of protecting 
employee benefit plans and the employees who benefit from these plans by 
allowing for availability of the court system and remedies.102 Therefore, when 
defining the terms of section 510 to determine if they are ambiguous, courts 
need to view and consider the intent behind those words placed by Congress 
in the creation of ERISA. In viewing the intent behind the words, it is clear 
that Congress’ intent when creating ERISA demands a broader interpretation 
to allow protection for unsolicited internal complaints.103   
Other Anti-Retaliation Provisions Are of Limited Value in Determining if 
ERISA Protects Unsolicited Internal Complaints
Several courts have made comparisons regarding the language of section 
510 of ERISA to various other anti-retaliation provisions, including most 
commonly FLSA and Title VII.104 Neither of the abovementioned statutes, 
however, provides statutory language identical to that of section 510 of 
ERISA.105 For the aforementioned reasons, ERISA cannot usefully be 
compared to other anti-retaliation provisions when a court is attempting to 
determine the scope of 510; instead, the courts should look to congressional 
intent, the dictionary, and the Secretary of Labor’s interpretations to decide 
that it does protect unsolicited internal complaints.    
For example, the Fourth Circuit wrongly compared section 510 of ERISA to 
the FLSA in determining that the “scope of the phrase ‘inquiry or proceeding’” 
is limited to formalities of a greater extent than those of “written or oral 
complaints made to a supervisor” including legal or administrative in nature as 
previously determined from Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Company.106 The Fourth 
Circuit’s comparison of ERISA and FLSA failed to account for differences in 
the respective statutory texts, namely ERISA’s use of the word “inquiry.”107  
101. Id. at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring) (explaining that fiduciaries must have protection 
in the initial stages of reporting to properly carry out their function).
102. See 29 U.S.C. §1001(b) (2006). 
103. Id. (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate 
commerce and interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . 
by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the federal courts.”). 
104.  See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 2011 WL 767661 (2011) (No. 10–732) (comparing the anti-retaliation provision in 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to section 510 of ERISA, arguing that the statutory 
language of the FLSA and section 510 are different and do not compel equivalent anti 
retaliation conclusions); King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003) (utilizing 
prior decision of the court where it held the FLSA contains narrower language than Title 
VII and thus does not protect intra-company complaints).
105. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224.
106. Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Company, 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (arguing 
the FLSA anti-retaliation provision protects employees only if there is a pending formal 
proceeding).
107. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) with 29 U.S.C. § 215(A)(3) (2006).
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When the Third Circuit’s decision in Edwards turned upon the definition 
of the word inquiry,108 the Court appeared to realize the impact of the word 
inquiry being used in section 510 of ERISA but not in FLSA or Title VII.109 
Nonetheless, it followed King v. Marriott International, Inc., in deciding 
that “inquiry or proceeding” requires a more formal action than an internal 
unsolicited complaint.110 By the Third Circuit following the King holding, it 
accepted the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in King which was derived from the 
comparison of ERISA and FLSA when it failed to provide a different analysis 
reaching the same conclusion.111 Although the Third Circuit claims it did not 
compare ERISA with other anti-retaliation provisions—in a way it did exactly 
that.  
A superior approach would have been to determine the plain meaning of 
the word “inquiry” by using Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines the term 
as a request for information. Moreover, if the Third Circuit had consulted the 
definition of inquiry provided by Webster’s Third International Dictionary, 
which defines an inquiry as “an act or an instance of seeking truth, information 
or knowledge about something,”it would have been clear that in “seeking 
[the] truth” an employee would be covered for “giving information” through 
an unsolicited internal complaint in order for the truth of the violation to be 
uncovered.112  
Another reason the courts should not seek to compare and contrast ERISA 
with other anti-retaliation provisions is the use of the modifying word “any” 
before “inquiry” in section 510 of ERISA. By modifying the word inquiry by 
the use of any, this allows the inference that section 510 should accommodate 
multiple types of complaints. The Supreme Court has determined that “the 
word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately 
of whatever kind.’”113 This stated definition of any should be applied to the 
following word of inquiry to indicate that there should be no discrimination 
as to what “given information” means in relation to an inquiry.” The word 
any undermines the Third Circuit’s conclusion that inquiry does not allow for 
“inquires made by an employee.”114 In order to fulfill the expansive meaning of 
any, it is imperative for the courts to first apply the broader definition of inquiry, 
as discussed above, to include employees who are searching for the truth in 
addition to allowing for multiple types of inquiries to be protected, regardless 
of whether the employee is being inquired of or doing the inquiring. Finally, in 
comparing FLSA and Title VII, while the word any does appear in both FLSA 
and Title VII, neither provision contains the word inquiry. Therefore, the direct 
comparison of the use of the word any in the various anti-retaliation provisions 
 
 
108. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223. 
109. Id. at 224–25.
110. Id. at 223.  
111. Id.  
112. webster’s third new international dictionary 1167 (1993).
113. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (quoting 
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).
114. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.  
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would be flawed since any would be a modification to a different term creating 
a different analysis.115
This is not to say that there is no persuasive weight in comparing ERISA 
to other anti-retaliation provisions. There are some similarities between 
ERISA and other anti-retaliation provisions, particularly between ERISA and 
FLSA.116 However, this persuasive weight is not enough for courts to rely on 
for two reasons. First, there will be different interpretations based on different 
words included or excluded from the individual anti-retaliation provision. For 
example, the word inquiry is included in ERISA but not in FLSA.117 Second, 
if courts rely on interpretations under FLSA to decide ERISA, they would 
simply be replacing one circuit split with another since similar circuit splits are 
occurring in determining if FLSA provides protection against anti-retaliation 
for internal complaints.118    
Whether or not the court finds interpretations of other anti-retaliation 
provisions persuasive, it is clear that not all anti-retaliation provisions are 
created equally. Allowing interpretation of either FLSA or Title VII to be 
adopted as the correct interpretation of ERISA without providing a detailed 
explanation will undoubtedly increase the amount of circuit splits and add to 
the confusion. Section 510 of ERISA insists upon the interpretation of its terms 
to be decided by congressional intent and should be distinguished from various 
anti-retaliation provisions.    
The Secretary of Labor’s Interpretations Regarding Section 510 of ERISA 
Should Be Instructive to the Court.
The Secretary of Labor has, in various amicus briefs, insightfully explained 
why section 510 should encompass protection for unsolicited internal 
complaints.119 The views of the Secretary of Labor should be more strongly 
considered by the courts for two reasons. First, the Secretary’s position should 
be instructive because the “Secretary [of Labor] has primary enforcement and 
regulatory authority for Title I of ERISA” allowing the Secretary of Labor to 
have more expertise in dealing with section 510 of ERISA.120 Second, section 
 
 
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).  
116. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) with 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
118. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224 (finding that FLSA affords protection for internal 
complaints are the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eight, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits). See 
Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1999); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, 
L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008); E.E.O.C. v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 
989 (6th Cir. 1992); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Love v. RE/MAX of 
Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984); E.E.O.C. v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 
1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989). However, two circuits have held that FLSA does not afford 
protection for internal complaints. See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 
1993); Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000).  
119. See generally Brief for the Secretary of Labor for Edwards, supra note 94. See 
also Brief of the Secretary of Labor for Nicolaou, supra note 25, at 6.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
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510 of ERISA needs to be interpreted in such a way to allow the Secretary of 
Labor the ability to effectively enforce and regulate section 510 of ERISA.    
In regards to the first issue, the Secretary of Labor has time after time 
interpreted section 510 to encompass unsolicited internal complaints without 
comparing ERISA to other anti-retaliation provisions.121 In light of this, 
the Third Circuit rejected the Secretary’s analysis but did little to explain 
why.122 The Third Circuit looked to the definition of inquiry and proceeding 
and then simply pushed the brief aside without looking to the substantive 
argument provided by the Secretary of Labor.123 The Third Circuit failed to 
fully comprehend the extent of the Secretary of Labor’s argument that “the 
text of section 510 should be read broadly to effectuate the remedial purposes 
of ERISA and the intent of Congress in drafting section 510.”124 While the 
Third Circuit did address the argument regarding urging an expansive reading 
of section 510 because it is a remedial statute, the Third Circuit did not 
satisfactorily address if the broad interpretation argued for by the Secretary of 
Labor would further congressional intent.125  
Second, the Secretary of Labor is well positioned to appreciate the 
consequences of a judicial holding that section 510 of ERISA does not protect 
unsolicited internal complaints. The number of people covered by ERISA is 
significantly greater than the amount of resources allocated to the Secretary of 
Labor and the Department of Labor.126 Therefore, the Secretary of Labor relies 
on employees being able to report ERISA violations internally in order to be 
able to provide the most efficient enforcement of ERISA.    
erisa section 510 remedies and the Unanswered QUestions
Regrettably, even if unsolicited internal complaints are protected, this may 
not provide a remedy for wrongfully terminated employees. Although ERISA 
is a remedial statute,127 the only remedies provided to employees who have 
been retaliated against pursuant to section 510 are stated under section 502(a)
(3) of ERISA, which allows for “appropriate equitable relief.”128 At first glance 






121. Brief For the Secretary of Labor for Edwards, supra note 94, at 23. Although the 
Secretary of Labor does not look to other anti-relation provisions to determine the breadth 
of ERISA section 510, the Secretary instead suggests that since the FLSA and the CWA 
have been interpreted to encompass their purpose of protecting employees who complain 
to management from retaliation, section 510 should be interpreted similarly. Id. at 7–8. 
122. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222–23. 
123. Id. at 223.
124. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor for Edwards, supra note 94, at 7.  
125. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223–24. 
126. Id.
127. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(3) (2006).
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regularly determined that this only allows for “categories of relief that were 
typically available in equity” and do not include “compensatory damages.”129 
Therefore, when employees have been wrongfully fired and are without a 
salary, they may not seek damages awarding back pay.130 Absent the appropriate 
remedies, employees may once again have the incentive not to report ERISA 
violations.131 
But, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011), opened the door for 
the court to provide equitable relief, especially in suits concerning a claim by a 
beneficiary against a plan trustee, about the terms of the plan.132 Reasoning that 
the plan beneficiary is equivalent to a trustee and the plan itself is equivalent 
to a trust, “this is the kind of lawsuit that, before the merger of law and equity, 
[ ] could have [been] brought [ ] in a court of equity[,] not a court of law.”133 
And, as such allows for the court to award traditional equitable remedies: 
injunctive remedies, mandamus and restitution.134 By affirming the District 
Court’s injunction, which required the plan administrator to pay beneficiaries 
money owed to them under the plan, the Court was providing for an equitable 
monetary remedy against a trustee called a “surcharge.”135 But, even though 
the Court opened the door to providing monetary relief, through a surcharge, 
the scope of the relief is limited.  As Justice Breyer articulates “to obtain relief 
by surcharge . . . a plan participant or beneficiary must show that the violation 
injured him or her”.136 
129. Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 484 F.3d 644, 654–56 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Mertens 
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)). The relief was typically assessed in terms of 
equity include, but is not limited to, restitution and injunctions. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 
(1993).
130. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that back pay is not an appropriate equitable relief for violations of section 510 of 
ERISA). 
131. Ultimately, the decision on how to handle remedies if section 510 is found to 
protect unsolicited internal complaints is still down the road and is beyond the scope of 
this Note. In order to determine what remedies should be provided, the Court will need to 
balance the need for appropriate remedies in order for employees to be willing to report 
ERISA violations with creating an appropriate remedy to ensure that the intent of Congress 
is not lost.                
132. 131 S. Ct. at 1879.  
133. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 253 n.4 (2008); 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1995).
134. Id. (citing Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 464 
(1939); Third Restatement Sec. 95, and Comment a; G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Trust and 
Trustees, Sec. 862 (rev. 2d ed. 1995); 4 Scott & Ascher Subsection 24.2, 24.9, at 1659-
60, 1686; Seocnd Restatement Sec. 197) (“But the fact that this relief takes the form of a 
money payment does not remove it from the category of traditionally equitable relief.”)
135. 131 S. Ct. at 1881. 
136. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 2011 WL 767661 (2011) (No. 10–732).  
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conclUsion
The Supreme Court recently passed on their opportunity to provide 
uniformity to the law when it denied the petition for writ of certiorari in the 
case of Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc.137 Unfortunately, this leaves both 
employees and employers in a midst of uncertainty given the current circuit 
split. Additionally, this circuit split conflicts with congressional intent, as it 
does not provide a uniform regulation of ERISA.
In allowing protection for unsolicited internal complaints under section 510 
of ERISA, the multiple intentions of Congress when creating ERISA will be 
upheld. By creating a more manageable amount of alleged ERISA violations 
that the Secretary of Labor must address, the burden placed on the shoulders 
of the Secretary of Labor would be lifted. This would allow employees to 
inform their supervisor, manager, plan fiduciary, or sponsor of the violation. 
Further, the incentive to retaliate against their employees for reporting ERISA 
violations would be taken off the table.  
Although the decision to protect unsolicited internal complaints under 
section 510 of ERISA will create additional questions about what remedies 
will be made available, the first step that needs to be taken is for the courts to 
re-examine congressional intent to find that it warrants protecting unsolicited 
internal complaints. With this intent of Congress in mind, the court then 
needs to broaden the interpretation of the word inquiry within section 510 of 
ERISA to allow protection of employees who are “seeking [the] truth” when 
reporting violations.138 This combination of congressional intent, an expanded 
interpretation of the word inquiry, and policy considerations of the Secretary 
of Labor and policy should allow any court to find that unsolicited internal 
complaints are protected under section 510 of ERISA.  
 
137. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 2011 WL 767661 (2011) (No. 10–732).  
138. webster’s third new international dictionary 1167 (1993).
